

# WWS 300 DEMOCRACY

Fall 2011, Tu-Th, 10-10:50

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## Course Description

This course introduces students to the following topics: the institutional basis of economic development, democratic transitions and democratic consolidation, electoral representation and political accountability, policymaking in a democracy, the relationship between democracy and redistribution, welfare and democracy, and colonialism/globalism and democracy.

Among the questions we ask are: Why do states form? Under what conditions do countries become democratic? What is the role of civil society in democratic performance? What is the nature of the politics of democratic governance? What are the limits of democratic control? What is the role of political institutions in the formation of public policy?

We first explore why economic development has been elusive in most of the globe. After showing the limitations of purely economic models of growth, we consider how political institutions, social norms, the distribution of wealth and the inheritance of colonialism shape growth rates. This discussion of the political and institutional sources of growth also includes an analysis of the historical forces that shaped, in turn, those institutions. Then we consider how democratic institutions function, paying particular attention to whose interests are represented and who governs. We close the course by looking at the impact that democratic politics may have on the economy and the welfare of citizens. We examine the formation of welfare states across countries – here we pay special attention to differences in the internal structure of public spending between the United States and Europe. We finally discuss the extent to which policy-makers can develop autonomous policies in a globalized world.

## Organization

The course will meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 10 to 10:50 a.m., and each student will also be assigned to a precept. Most of the class meetings will be lectures, but there will also be frequent class discussions.

Required materials will include a few books to be purchased which are available at Labyrinth Bookstore and material on e-reserve through the Stokes Library. Books to be purchased are listed on the syllabus and

noted by the symbol (\*).

There will be an in-class final examination. Each student will also be expected to submit two four-page response papers, one in lieu of the mid-term examination, and the other will occur later in the term. Grading will be based 45% on the final exam, 40% on the two short papers, and 15% on class participation.

### **Books available at Labyrinth Bookstore**

Douglass North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Robert Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Paul Bairoch. *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford University Press.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*.

Dahl, Robert *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City*

Mayhew, David. 1974. *The Electoral Connection*

Rosenberg, Gerald. *The Hollow Hope*

Ginsburg, Tom. *Judicial Review in New Democracies*

## **PART I. THE TWIN PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.**

### **Week 1. Economic Development: Technology or “Institutions”?**

#### Required Reading

William Easterly. 2001. *The Elusive Quest for Growth*. The MIT Press. Chapters 3 & 4. (or, for those with some technical know-how or curiosity: Barro, Robert. 1997. *Macroeconomics*. Fifth edition. Chapter 11.)

Douglass North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-69. (\*)

#### Further Reading

Robert Barro. 1997. *Determinants of Economic Growth*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Chapter 1

### **Week 2. Political Institutions and Growth: The Problem of Building a State and Controlling It.**

#### Required Reading

*The Problem of Political Order*

Olson, Mancur. 2000. *Power and Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books. Chapter 1.

*Constitutions and Credible Commitment*

North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast, 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,” *The Journal of Economic History* 49, (December): 803-832.

DeLong, Bradford J. and Andrei Shleifer. 1993. “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution,” *Journal of Law and Economics* 36 (October): 671-702.

*Dictatorships and Democracy*

Przeworski, Adam. 2000. *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

### **Week 3. Social Norms, Political Culture and Growth**

#### Required Reading

Robert Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. (\*)

#### **Week 4. One World or Many Worlds? Colonialism, Inequality and Economic Stagnation.**

##### Required Reading

Paul Bairoch. *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Chapters 5, 6 and 8. (\*)

Engerman, Stanley L. and Sokoloff, Kenneth L. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies," *Economia*, 3: 41-102.

Robert Wade. 1992. "East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence," *World Politics* 44: 270-320. Read pages 310-20 only.

#### **Week 5. Democracy as an Equilibrium. Democratic Transitions.**

##### Required Reading

Boix, Carles. 2006. "The Roots of Democracy" *Policy Review*.

Boix, Carles. 2011. "Democracy, Development and the International System". Working paper.

Anderson, Perry. 1974. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. Verso. Conclusions. Pages 397-431.

#### **Week 6: Political Power Within A Democracy**

##### Required Reading

Dahl, Robert *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* ch. , 8, 12,21, and 23 (\*)

Bartels, Larry. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age* chapters 9.

Gilens, Martin. 2005. "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 69(5):778-896

#### **Week 7: Parties and Elections**

##### Required Reading

Aldrich, John. *Why Parties?* Chapters 1 and 2.

Cox, Gary. *Making Votes Count* ch. 2-3

Grofman, Bernard. "The Impact of Electoral Laws on Political Parties" *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini "Electoral Systems and Economic Policy" *Oxford Handbook of*

*Political Economy.*

Bartels, Larry. *Unequal Democracy*. Ch. 2.

McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal. *Polarized America* ch. 1 - 3.

## **Week 8: Legislatures**

### Required Reading

Arnold, R. Douglas. *The Logic of Congressional Action* 1,2, and 4.

Laver, Michael. "Legislatures and Parliaments in Comparative Context" *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Krehbiel, Keith. *Pivotal Politics* ch. 2

McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal. *Polarized America* ch. 6

David Canon. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation*, ch 1

### Optional Reading

Brady, David and Craig Volden *Revolving Gridlock* ch 2 (less technical presentation of model in Krehbiel)

## **Week 9: Executives and Bureaucracies**

### Required Reading

Cheibub, Jose *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy* ch. 1-2.

Tsbelis, George. *Veto Players: How Institutions Work* ch. 3.

Moe, Terry "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure" in *Can the Government Govern?*, p. 267-329.

Wilson, James Q. *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies do and Why They Do It*, p. 315-378.

## **Week 10: Courts**

### Required Reading

Bickel, Alexander *The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics*, chapter 1.

Rosenberg, Gerald. *The Hollow Hope*, chapter 1 and part 1

Ginsburg, Tom. *Judicial Review in New Democracies* p. 1-90.

### **Week 11. Democracies and Welfare States.**

Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2 through 7.

I. Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater & Timothy Smeeding. 2006. "A Re-Examination of Welfare States and Inequality in Rich Nations" *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 25: 897-919, 2006.

### **Week 12. Globalization and Economic Governance in Democratic Settings**

Przeworski, Adam and Covadonga Meseguer. 2006. "Globalization and Democracy." In Pranab Bardhan,

Samuel Bowles and Michael Wallerstein, eds. 2006. *Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution*. Princeton University and Russell Sage Foundation. Chapter 7.

Michael Spence and Sandile Hlatshwayo. 2011. "The Evolving Structure of the American Economy and the Employment Challenge," Working paper. Council of Foreign Relations. March.