Political Dynasties and Party Strength: Evidence from Victorian Britain

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Abstract

Political dynasties raise concerns about elite entrenchment in democracies. Existing studies on dynastic politicians find these politicians have an electoral advantage. However, they fail to consider strategies political parties use to cope with dynasts. By contrast, work on party organizations ignores issues of candidate selection. I bridge both literatures by developing a theory where parties face a trade-off between nominating strong but undisciplined dynastic politicians, or loyal but weak non-dynastic candidates. I predict parties rely on dynasts in districts where local organizations are weak. Using a novel data set of party strength in Victorian Britain, I show Liberal (but not Conservative) dynasts ran less often where local party organizations were present and dissented more frequently from the party line. These findings demonstrate party weakness is key to explaining the demise of traditional elites. This evidence is also consistent with work characterizing Conservative party organization as ineffectual in the pre-1880 period.

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For a long time parties had no distinct life of their own save in Parliament; in the country they barely existed as moral entities independently of the personages or families which were an embodiment of them.

- Moisei Ostrogorski, 1902

(...) we owe our position in the country, and have always done, much more to local personal influence than to the popularity of our own political party.

- Walter Hume Long, MP, *Electoral Politics and Political Change in the East Midlands of England, 1918-1935*, P. R. Shorter, Cambridge, 1975) quoted by Cannadine (1990, 150)

1 Introduction

Dynasties represent a form of elite entrenchment and the unequal distribution of political power in democracies. From a Rawlsian perspective, one could justify this type of inequality if it improved the welfare of society at large. However, this seems hardly the case. There is no evidence dynastic politicians (defined as those who have a least one relative who served in office prior to their starting their career) improve the welfare of citizens (Braganca, Ferraz, and Ríos, 2015), and the persistence of dynasts in power may allow their family members to accumulate rents (Folke, Persson, and Rickne, Forthcoming). Political dynasties also undermine the quality of representation in other ways. Often, for example, members of dynasties represent the most privileged classes in their country. By giving voice to a narrow set of interest in the legislature, dynasts violate the principle of descriptive representation (Pitkin, 1967).

Yet, there is wide cross-national and temporal variation in the persistence of political dynasties (E. Dal Bo, P. Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009; Geys and Smith, Forthcoming; Smith, Forthcoming; Van Coppenolle, 2017). Among developing countries, for example, 22 percent of national legislators in India are dynastic (Chandra, 2016). In the Philippines, the share of dynastic politicians in the legislature is close to 60 percent (Querubin, 2016). There is also significant variation in the incidence of hereditary politicians across developed nations. In

Japan, dynasts account for 20 percent of legislators (Asako et al., 2015). In the US, although dynastic politicians accounted for no more than 6 percent of national representatives in the late 1990s, in the eve of the Civil War they held a fifth of seats in Congress (E. Dal Bo, P. Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009).

What accounts for the persistence of political dynasties? Existing studies on dynastic politicians find these politicians enjoy an electoral advantage (Asako et al., 2015; E. Dal Bo, P. Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Querubin, 2016; Rossi, 2009). However, this work fails to consider the strategies political parties may use to cope with dynasts to win elections. By contrast, work on party organizations places this variable at the heart of the electoral success of modern parties (see, for example, Aldrich, 1995; Panebianco, 1988; Tavits, 2013; Ziblatt, 2017). Yet, this literature ignores issues of candidate election.

This paper bridges both literatures to explain the incidence of political dynasties. To do so, I introduce a framework in which parties decide to nominate either dynastic, or non-dynastic candidates to maximize the number of seats they hold in a legislature. Parties make this decision subject to maintaining a minimum level of discipline in parliament. Parties, however, face a trade-off in deciding which type of candidate to nominate. While dynastic candidates have an electoral advantage, this advantage allows them to be less disciplined in parliament, thereby weakening party brands. Finally, parties as a result of limited resources have different levels of organizational strength across districts. In this setting, I predict political parties are more likely to rely on dynastic candidates in places where their organizations are weak. Parties are willing to incur the loss in party discipline only when it is necessary to rely on dynastic politicians to guarantee their electoral success.

To test this theory, I analyze a novel data set of party strength in Victorian Britain, a country and period that represents the canonical case of the birth of mass party organizations. To examine the strategies parties adopted to cope with dynasts, my analysis focuses on the two major parties of the period and shows Liberal dynastic candidates were less likely to

run for office in districts where parties reported the presence of local organizations.[1] The analysis also finds Liberal dynastic legislators dissented from the party line more frequently in highly partisan roll calls. These findings suggest dynastic politicians were more likely to run in places where parties were weak because of the trade-off parties face when nominating candidates. Together, my findings demonstrate the strength of party organization is a key factor in explaining the demise of political dynasties, a form of traditional elite.[2]

However, the negative relationship between local party organizations and the incidence of dynastic candidates may be the result of reverse causality: party organizations may simply have appeared in constituencies where dynasts were weak. To address this concern I: (1) show party strength predicts the incidence of dynastic candidates after controlling for the presence of patrons (a proxy for the power of dynasties); and (2) perform a "placebo test" showing party organizations predict the incidence of dynasties only after the expansion of the franchise (i.e., only after party organizations were established). Further, the negative impact of party strength on the incidence of dynastic candidates is robust to controlling for demographic characteristics of constituencies (e.g., boroughs vs. counties), magnitude of expansion of the franchise, and levels of political competition.

Among Conservatives, I find party strength does not explain the incidence of dynastic candidates and that dynastic legislators were less likely to dissent from the party line. I argue this is because, during the period of interest, Conservatives remained an elite party with ineffectual organizations (Ziblatt, 2017). Professionals did not have enough influence to shape the electoral strategy of parties, and local organization lacked the resources to bring about success at the polls.

My paper builds on existing literature explaining the variation in the incidence of dynastic politicians. Smith (Forthcoming) shows candidate-oriented electoral systems and a

[1]The paper closest to my approach is Berlinski, Dewan, and Van Coppenolle (2014). However, their study focuses on the impact of franchise expansion following the Second Reform Act on the incidence of *elected* politicians with an aristocratic or dynastic background. As I explain below, my approach focuses on the impact of party organizations on the incidence of dynastic *candidates*, and my analysis differentiates outcomes by the party affiliation of candidates.

[2]Indeed, Appendix E suggests dynastic politicians engaged more often in patronage.

decentralized nomination procedure increase the incidence of dynastic politicians. Chhibber (2011) argues that centralized party finance, and weak party links with outside organizations, gives rise to dynastic successions in the party leadership. These accounts, however, miss important geographic variation in the incidence of dynasts, crucial to understanding the political development of countries (Caramani, 2004), because the main variables of interest are fixed at the party or country level.

This paper also makes empirical contributions by providing a direct measure of party organizational strength. I rely on party surveys recording the presence of associations at the district level. These surveys allow measurement of party organizational strength at a low level of geographical aggregation independent from electoral outcomes and candidate characteristics. This contrasts with existing studies that rely on measures endogenous to party strength and candidate selection, such as electoral volatility (Keefer and Khemani, 2009; Nooruddin and Chhibber, 2007), or partisan control of local offices (Tavits, 2011, 2013).

More broadly, my paper provides a framework for understanding the connection between party organizational strength and personalistic politics. Existing work shows organizations increase party cohesion (Tavits, 2013), but is silent on the implications for candidate selection. Other studies show businessmen (Gehlbach, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya, 2010), criminals (Aidt, Golden, and Tiwari, 2011), and personalistic candidates (Keefer and Khemani, 2009) run in places with low party strength, but ignore the trade-offs parties face when relying on personalistic politicians. My theory and findings show that when parties invest in organizations, their reliance on personalistic candidates diminishes, thereby improving party discipline and strengthening party brands.

2 Theoretical Framework

A scholarly tradition focuses on party organizations as a form of party development. This research recognizes that it is very hard for parties to survive without building an organiza-

tional machinery in the wake of mass electorates (Aldrich, 1995; Michels, 1959; Ostrogorski, 1902; Panebianco, 1988). Recent work in this tradition focuses on the impact of party organization on the success of post-communist parties in Eastern Europe (Tavits, 2013), the viability of democracy (Kreuzer, 2001; Ziblatt, 2017), and the nationalization of politics in Western Europe (Caramani, 2004).

I build on this work to assess the impact of party strength on the incidence of dynastic politicians (i.e., those who had a relative in power before they first ran for office). In doing so, my argument places emphasis on the role of local party organizations, which are key to guaranteeing electoral success (Tavits, 2013; Ziblatt, 2017). They canvass voters during election time; are repositories of know-how in running elections; and in periods between elections help in registering voters and providing information to parties on the needs affecting a community.

However, to assess the impact of local organizations on the demand for dynastic candidates it is necessary to recognize two points. First, political parties have limited resources. This point implies spatial variation in the distribution of party organizations, which may reflect past political support for a party, the magnitude of the electorate, and/or the resources available to political candidates.[3]

Second, dynastic politicians are likely substitutes for local party organizations. Previous studies have found dynasts benefit from the political capital of their office-holding relatives to secure power (E. Dal Bo, P. Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009; Querubin, 2016; Rossi, 2009),[4] obtain higher votes shares, and are more likely to win office (Asako et al., 2015; Feinstein, 2010). This advantage may stem from their family name, having a more established network of

[3]The rest of the section takes the organizational strength of parties as exogenous. However, the empirical analysis leverages the expansion of the franchise associated with the Second Reform Act in Britain as a shock to estimate the impact of party strength on a party's demand for dynastic politicians. The empirical analysis also takes into account other observable factors that can possibly influence candidate selection and organizational strength.

[4]One exception is Van Coppenolle (2017), who finds a null effect for the inter-generational incumbency advantage in the British House of Commons. One reason for the null finding is that staying in office required a significant investment on behalf of politicians (Rush, 2001). As such, it may have been that politicians did not derive any additional benefits from holding office that could contribute towards the emergence and persistence of dynasties.

operatives, and/or their pecuniary resources.[5] At the same time, the advantage in resources affords dynastic candidates independence from parties. For example, Kam (2009) shows parties rely on promotion within, and expulsion from, the party to induce discipline among their members. I argue that these tools are less effective among dynasts, who depend less on party resources for their electoral success.

The dynastic advantage in resources generates a trade-off for political parties between nominating electorally strong but undisciplined dynastic politicians, or loyal but weak non-dynastic candidates. This will be particularly the case when parties care about maximizing the number of seats they hold in a legislature subject to the constraint of maintaining a certain level of discipline among its members. Parties may need to ensure they win the largest number of seats possible to pass legislation and maximize the share of rents they derive from office. In both Continental and Westminster systems, for instance, the party commanding a majority in parliament plays a dominant role in shaping the cabinet composition and setting the legislative agenda. However, capturing a large share of seats in parliament means nothing if a party cannot maintain a certain level of unity among its members. In particular, the inability to ensure discipline among its members undermines a party's efforts to push its legislative agenda through parliament, results in cabinet reshuffling (Kam and Indridason, 2005), erodes party brands (Carey, 2007), and ultimately hurts the electoral prospects of parties (Kam, 2009; Tavits, 2013).

Given the trade-off involved in the process of candidate selection and limited party resources, I predict parties are more likely to nominate dynastic candidates in districts with low levels of organizational strength. When local organizations are absent, a party needs to make up for its electoral deficiencies. Dynastic candidates are a solution to this problem. When parties are weak, they are willing to pay the cost in terms of a loss in parliamentary

[5]One can think of dynasts as belonging to the general class of personalistic politicians. Members of this class enjoy an advantage in individual resources such as money, brand name, and/or network of operatives. The theory discussed in this section does not put a strong emphasis on which specific factor matters most. Rather, the argument introduced here relies on the assumption that dynastic politicians have an advantage across these dimensions over non-dynastic politicians.

discipline to ensure an electoral victory.[6]

So far the discussion assumes a monolithic party. However, a factor mediating the impact of local party organizations on the demand for dynastic politicians is the nature of the party leadership. One important aspect in the development of parties is the role of "professionals" (Tavits, 2013; Ziblatt, 2017). When politicians with the know-how to run elections come into control of a party, they are able to marshal the power of local organizations to guarantee electoral success. Indeed, as discussed in the next section, only Liberals had made this transition in the pre-1880 period. As a result, one should expect the negative impact of party organization on the incidence dynastic candidates to hold only for the Liberal party.

The theory I propose follows the "territoriality" of politics approach introduced in Caramani (2004). It proposes to exploit spatial variation in the organizational strength of parties to explain the incidence of dynastic politicians. As the discussion illustrates, this approach can give us leverage in understanding why certain regions within a given country have more dynasties than others, why some parties are more dynastic than others, and why there is variation in the incidence of political dynasties across time and countries.

3 Historical Context

This section discusses the historical context in the years preceding and following the Second Reform Act (1867) in Britain. I focus on this period because it represents one of the canonical cases of the birth of mass party organizations (Ostrogorski, 1902). By reducing voting property qualifications, the reform led to an average increase of 150% (50%) in the size of the franchise in boroughs (counties) (Berlinski and Dewan, 2011). The wide expansion of the franchise gave parties an incentive to build organizations to win elections. But because organizations did not appear uniformly across Britain, this period is an instance during

[6]The theory does not rely on whether candidates have agency or mobility. Appendix A demonstrates that giving candidates bargaining power or mobility does not change the theory's main prediction. In addition, candidate mobility is not unrealistic in the context of Victorian Britain. Figure 9 in the Appendix shows that in a given election year about 20 percent of dynastic MPs represented a constituency not served by them or a member of their family in the past.

which we observe within-country variation in party organizational strength. Consequently, studying this period allows us to shed light on the relationship between party development and dynastic persistence in other settings.

The discussion of the historical context highlights three main patterns. First, the individual resources of candidates were key to guaranteeing electoral success during most of the period, and politicians used these resources to build dynasties. Second, the Second Reform Act increased the importance of party organization at the expense of individual resources. Third, only the Liberal party, however, developed a strong party organization, and politicians in this party were aware of the trade-off involved in the process of candidate selection.

3.1 Candidate Resources and Elections

Scholars refer to the period I examine as the "Plutocratic Era" (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981). During most of the nineteenth century, "there was an exceptionally high correlation between wealth, status, and power for the very simple reason that they were all territorially determined and defined ...indeed, wealth, status, and power were so closely intertwined in the case of British patrician classes that it is virtually impossible to write about one without mentioning the others." Cannadine (1990, p. 16)

Contributing to the correlation between wealth and power was the fact that members of parliament were unpaid, and wealth was essential to getting elected and staying in office (Hanham, 1959; Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981; Rush, 2001). Candidates covered all expenses associated with running for office, including, among other things, keeping the electoral register up to date, setting up polling stations, the fees of return officers, transporting voters to the polls, and entertaining them on election day (Gash, 1953; Hanham, 1959). Before the Second Reform Act, parties could provide little help because their level of organization outside parliament was rudimentary (Bulmer-Thomas, 1965; Cox, 1987; Herrick, 1945; McKenzie, 1951; Ostrogorski, 1902).

Patrons played a particularly important role in the emergence and perpetuation of po-

litical dynasties in Britain. A patron was a property owner (of land or capital), who used his influence and coercion to select, and/or secure votes for, his preferred electoral candidate (Gash, 1953, p. 175). Constituencies in their control came to be referred to as proprietary (or nomination) boroughs, and within them, patrons usually selected family members to hold a seat in the House of Commons (ibid., p. 215-216). Indeed, Figure 7 in the Appendix shows that in the period I examine 61 percent of Liberal and 73 percent of Conservative dynastic MPs serving in proprietary constituencies were related to the patron.

Finally, according to Gash (ibid., p. 202), owing to their resources, MPs backed by patrons had influence over the party agenda and were independent in their parliamentary behavior. And as noted in Hanham (1959), the role of patrons was not restricted to boroughs. Several counties saw landowners using their influence to have a member of their family elected to office.

3.2 Franchise Expansion and Party Organizations

With the advent of the Second Reform Act, parties faced an incentive to enlist the support of newly enfranchised voters via organizations outside parliament (Herrick, 1945; McKenzie, 1951; Ostrogorski, 1902). Local organizations became key to securing electoral success, as they provided a permanent body of workers that could canvass and mobilize voters at election time, thereby rendering personal resources superfluous (Ostrogorski, 1902, p. 213). At the same time, a larger electorate diminished the importance of individual resources, as it became more expensive for candidates to secure enough votes to win elections (Cox, 1987).

There is evidence, however, that Conservatives and Liberals (the two main competing parties in Britain) did not attain the same level of organizational development during the period of interest. For example, Ziblatt (2017) documents how Conservatives implemented a series of organizational innovations in the pre-1880 period. Nevertheless, party organization remained ineffectual: local associations did not increase turnout and delegate participation in national conferences was low. In addition, local party organizations had no impact on the

legislative behavior of MPs (Cox, 1987). Finally, the party also remained under the control of the old elites, who were opposed to the role of "professionals" in determining the party's electoral strategy (Ziblatt, 2017).

By contrast, among Liberals, the Birmingham "caucus" served as a model of party organization and spread across the country. Local associations were brought under the umbrella of the National Liberal Federation under the stewardship of Joseph Chamberlain. One sign of the robustness of these organizations is the high participation rate of delegates in the conferences of the federation held during the period.[7] Further, as the empirical evidence in Section 6 will show, these organizations exerted a strong influence on the behavior of MPs, making legislators less likely to defect from the party line. Finally, historians and political actors of the period credit the Liberal "caucus" model for the party's victory in the general election of 1880, which Conservatives later emulated to develop its own party organizations (ibid., p. 93-94).

The Liberal party also experienced a change in leadership during this time. The Whigs (a faction in which aristocratic landowners were prominent) traditionally had controlled the party, but their influence decreased over time. The end of the Whig dominance came with the Second Reform Act (Bulmer-Thomas, 1965, p. 107). The expansion of the franchise altered the balance of power in the party by strengthening the radical wing, a faction that espoused a more progressive agenda.[8] The rise of the Radicals, one can surmise, marked the turn toward the professionalization of the Liberal party. Aware of the need to mobilize the newly enfranchised workers to the win elections, they invested in developing the "caucus" model.

[7]For example, according to Spence Watson (1907, p. 3-5) all Liberal associations established under a popular basis (i.e. with an organizational capacity for canvassing) were invited to the inaugural conference, and there was no indication of absences.

[8]Gladstone's choice of W. E. Forster (an un-aristocratic M.P.) as minister of education signaled that "government by the Whig families was not to be revived" (Trevelyan, 1937, p. 348-349).

3.3 Candidate Selection and Trade-Offs

The national leadership of parties played an important role in the selection of candidates. This was particularly true in the latter half of the nineteenth century. From the 1850's onwards, Liberals and Conservatives created the position of a national agent. The national agent was in charge of taking care of the business associated with election petitions throughout the country, finding candidates, and drawing candidate lists (Bulmer-Thomas, 1965; Hanham, 1959, p. 108).

Local party organizations also may have played a role in the process of candidate selection as well (Hanham, 1959). However, local organizations had less influence among Conservaties because they were brought together under the umbrella of the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations to provide mobilizing support at the time of the election, rather than to set policy (McKenzie, 1951; Ostrogorski, 1902).[9]

Parties did not necessarily rely on local candidates. In several instances candidates were imported from other areas to secure a seat in parliament. For example, in cases where no class or group was dominant, "local party leaders would approach the party headquarters for lists of rich men and selected the richest of them as their candidate if he were not otherwise unsuitable" (Hanham, 1959, p. 66). In other cases, patrons owned property in several constituencies, allowing their preferred candidates some degree of mobility. For example, the Buccleuchs, Derbys, Devonshires, and Bedfords, as examples of families who owned properties across several counties (Cannadine, 1990, p. 10).

Perhaps owing to the level of organizational development the Liberal party had achieved, its members and leaders were aware of the trade-off involved in relying on well-endowed candidates to secure an electoral victory. For example, in the 1880's leftist commentators complained about the leadership's failure to reprimand members, who had opposed their foreign policy, to preserve party unity (Hanham, 1959, p. 354). Similarly, Liberal MPs

[9]H. Cecil Raikes, the first president of the National Union, declared famously: "The Union has been organized rather as a handmaid to the party than to usurp the functions of party leadership." (*Report of the Proceedings at the Seventh Annual Conference*, p. 10) quoted by Ostrogorski (1902, p. 119)

complained that whips (i.e. party officials in charge of making sure that MPs voted according to the party line) chose wealthy candidates at the expense of "sound" liberals (Hanham, 1959, p. 355).

3.4 Other Institutional Features of the Period

Races for seats in the House of Commons were determined by simple plurality. MPs represented county or borough constituencies. The former represented rural areas and the latter represented towns and industrial centers. Counties were more populous than boroughs, and required higher property qualifications for voting throughout the period (O'Leary, 1962; Seymour, 1915). District magnitude varied across constituencies, with the number of seats ranging from 1 to 4. Differences in magnitude were the result of the First (1832) and Second Reform Acts, which besides lowering voting property qualifications, redistributed seats across constituencies to abate corruption (often unsuccessfully), to increase the representation of specific classes (e.g., rising manufacturing sector), and to make apportionment of seats congruent with population (Seymour, 1915, ch. 3 and 11).

The period I examine coincides with the development of increasingly disciplined parties in parliament, resulting from changes in parliamentary procedures and the socio-economic composition of constituencies in the country (Cox, 1987). Finally, the country experienced a fast pace of reform in the last quarter of the of century with the adoption of the secret ballot (1872), the introduction of campaign spending limits and penalties for corruption under the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act (1883), a further expansion of the franchise under the Third Reform Act (1885), and the shift to single members districts across the majority of constituencies under the Redistribution of Seats Act (1885).

4 Data

Dynastic Politicians I rely on Stenton (1976) and Stenton and Lees (1978) to measure the incidence of dynastic politicians. These volumes contain the biographical profile of every MP who served in the House of Commons during the period 1832-1885. Each of these profiles

includes the names of a MP's close and (or) prominent relatives, along with information on whether they served in parliament and any titles they held. Based on this information, a legislator was coded as dynastic if at least one of his relatives (e.g., father, uncle, grandfather, in-law, brother, cousin) served in the House of Commons before he was elected.[10] [11]

Figure 6 in the Appendix shows the share of dynastic legislators was fairly similar across both parties until 1859, increasing from about 30% in 1832 to around 45% by the end of the period. After 1859, the proportion of dynastic MPs among Liberals declined rapidly, reaching a low of 18% by the end of the period. Among Conservatives, the share of dynastic legislators remained around 48% for most of the post-1859 period, and only declined after 1880 to reach a period low close to 28%.

Because testing my argument requires identifying the dynastic background of all candidates running for office, not only the winners, I traced the electoral history of every politician (i.e., the instances when they lost and won) who served in the post-1859 period. This process, however, leaves a subset of candidates who never won office, and for whom there are no background characteristics available. To address this issue, my analysis reports results relying on the sample including all races, and on the sample including only races where the background of every candidate is known.

Party Strength A key element of the theory I introduce is the organizational strength of parties. Measuring this variable is particularly difficult due to lack of data (Tavits, 2011, 2013). In this paper, I exploit surveys of the two major parties documenting the presence of local party organizations across the country in the post-1867 period. For Conservatives, I rely on the "Conservative Agents and Associations in the Counties and Boroughs of England and Wales" survey (Conservative Central Office, 1874). This document contains information

[10] I focus only on the House of Commons because it is the main elected assembly in Britain. This focus allows me to be consistent with previous studies on political dynasties (E. Dal Bo, P. Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009; Querubin, 2016; Van Coppenolle, 2017).

[11] Often, when an MP's relative was a peer, Stenton (1976) and Stenton and Lees (1978) fail to include information on whether the person served in the House of Commons. In those cases I checked `http://www.leighrayment.com`, previously used in Clark (2014), to determine whether he had served as MP.

on the name and number of associations and agents in England and Wales as of 1874.[12] For Liberals, I rely on the National Liberal Federation (NLF) Annual Reports and Proceedings (Barker, 1880). This source provides information on constituencies affiliated to the federation. I specifically rely on the 1880 issue, as this is the first one to report information on affiliates.

The coding criteria for the measurement of party strength is as follows. For Conservatives, I created binary variable recording whether a constituency had at least one local association in 1874.[13] Similarly, for Liberals I coded a binary variable indicating whether a constituency was affiliated to the NLF in 1880.[14] Finally, for comparability purposes, given the geographic scope of the information available for Conservatives, I restrict the analysis to constituencies in England and Wales. Under this coding, 47% of constituencies in Britain had at least one Conservative association. The corresponding figure for Liberals is 20%.

Patrons Patrons played an important role in the political life of Victorian Britain. Thus, they must be included in any explanation of the incidence of dynastic politicians. For the post-1867 period, Hanham (1959) provides a list of boroughs and counties under the control of a patron, a patrons's identity and partisanship, and the identity of the patron's relatives who held a seat in the House of Commons.[15] Using this information I coded two binary variables (one for each party) indicating whether a constituency was under the influence of a patron. Approximately 13% and 8% of constituencies were under the influence of a Conservative and Liberal patron, respectively.

[12]Cox (1987) used this information to assess the impact of party organization on the legislative behavior of MPs and Ziblatt (2017) relied on it to examine the effectiveness of local party associations in the pre-1880 period.

[13]I dichotomized the variable because few constituencies reported two or more organizations.

[14]The NLF proceedings of 1880 lists a total of 99 affiliated associations across England, Scotland, and Wales, which is very close to the total number of associations invited to the inaugural conference of the federation (see p. 3-5 in Spence Watson, 1907). This suggests very few associations, if any, declined to join the federation. However, the NLF proceedings lists 33 affiliates in towns that were not enfranchised. Out of these affiliates, 16 were in the vicinity of 4 borough constituencies that were Liberal affiliates as of 1880 (Birmingham, Bath, Dudley, and Walsall). I do not have coordinates to map the remaining ones in their corresponding counties. Thus, as a robustness check, the analysis in the next section estimates the impact of party organization on the demand for dynasts in the sample including only boroughs.

[15]See Appendix III in (Hanham, 1959).

Electoral Data I rely on Eggers and Spirling (2014) to obtain the following information on all electoral races in the period 1859-1885: identity and partisanship of candidates running for office, level of turnout, number of votes for each of the competing candidates, and district magnitude. I complement this information with an indicator for constituency type (county or borough) as recorded in Craig (1977), and with population levels for specific years as recorded in McCalmont (1971).

Parliamentary Divisions To assess whether dynastic MPs were more likely to dissent from the party line in important votes in parliament, I rely on Eggers and Spirling (2014, 2016). I use Eggers and Spirling (2014) to obtain information on all divisions (roll calls) in the three parliaments following the Second Reform Act. I then use Eggers and Spirling (2016) to identify all divisions where chief whips (officers in charge of instructing members how to vote) of both parties were tellers (i.e., individuals in charge of tallying party votes in a given division). This information allows me to identify party preferences and votes in the divisions that parties cared about the most.

5 Party Strength and Political Dynasties

In this section I examine the relationship between organizational strength and the incidence of dynastic candidates. The analysis shows Liberal dynastic candidates were less likely to run for office in constituencies reporting the presence of a local party association. I also show party associations predict the incidence of dynasts only after the Second Reform Act, which suggests local organizations are not endogenous to the presence of dynasts. This evidence suggests Liberals relied on dynasts to make up for their organizational weakness. Among Conservatives, party organizational strength is not correlated with dynastic candidates running for a seat in parliament. This finding is consistent with, and provides further support to, Cox (1987) and Ziblatt (2017) who show that Conservative local associations were ineffective.

5.1 Distribution of Local Party Organizations in Victorian Britain

Figure 1 shows significant variation in the presence of Liberal and Conservative local party organizations across the country. The maps display the presence of party organizations using the indicator variables described in Section 4. The panel on the left maps the distribution of constituencies affiliated to the NLF. Counties (boroughs) with a black (red) dot were affiliated to the NLF. The difference in organizational presence between counties and boroughs is quite pronounced among Liberals, as they had virtually no organizations in rural constituencies. The panel on the right maps the distribution of Conservative associations. Counties (boroughs) with a black (red) dot reported the presence of at least one association. The map shows that although Conservative organizations were also less prevalent in counties, they were fairly scattered across the country.



Figure 1: **Organizational Strength of Liberal and Conservative Parties in England and Wales.** The left panel displays the distribution of constituencies affiliated to the National Liberal Federation across Britain in 1880. Counties (boroughs) with a black (red) dot report the presence of at least one association. The right panel of Figure 1 displays the distribution of Conservative associations across constituencies in England and Wales in 1874.

Consistent with the historical accounts discussed in Section 3, Appendix C shows the

presence of patrons and the magnitude of the franchise are two important factors explaining the spatial distribution of organizations. However, the analysis in the next subsection shows that even after controlling for the these confounders, party organizations still have a strong effect on the incidence of Liberal dynastic candidates.

5.2 Party Strength and the Incidence of Dynasts

To examine the relationship between party strength and the demand for dynasts, I fit a binomial regression where the outcome is the number of dynastic candidates running for office and the main predictor is a binary indicator for the presence of a local organization.[16] My theory predicts the local organizational presence of parties should be negatively correlated with the probability of a dynast running for office, indicating that dynasts compete only in places where parties are weak.

As additional controls, I include in the regressions a binary indicator for the type of constituency (borough or county), district magnitude, a binary indicator for whether the constituency is under the influence of a patron, the log of population in 1871, and the change in the size of the electorate following the Second Reform Act.[17] As Section 4 notes, there is measurement error in the outcome when at least one candidate never elected to office runs in a constituency. Therefore, I also report results relying on the sample of constituencies where the background of all candidates is known.

Table 1 reports regression estimates for Liberals. Columns (1)-(5) present estimates for the sample including all constituencies. Columns (6)-(10) report estimates relying on the sample where I was able to ascertain the dynastic background of all Liberal candidates. Across all specifications the point estimate for *Organization* is negative (and significant in the restricted sample), indicating party strength reduced the demand for Liberal dynastic

[16]The sample for Liberals comes from the 1880 races, the first election following the measurement of the NLF constituency affiliations. For Conservatives, the sample consists of races in the 1874 general election – the publication year of the party's associations survey. All standard errors in the regressions reported in this section account for overdispersion.

[17]The analysis drops constituencies that do not report the number of electors in the 1868 election, for which one cannot compute the change in electorate size.

candidates. The estimates from Table 1 imply dynastic candidates were 19 percentage points less likely to run in constituencies affiliated to the NLF (the 95% confidence interval is [-33, -5]).[18] Since Liberal organizations are virtually absent in counties, Table 4 in the Appendix repeats the analysis relying on the sample including only boroughs and the main results hold.

However, perhaps political competition is a better explanation for the results reported in Table 1. A member of a political dynasty may be an example of a bad quality politician, and Galasso and Nannicini (2011) show the optimal strategy for parties is to run low-quality candidates in constituencies with low levels of political competition. This is problematic for my argument if places without local party organization also report low levels of political competition.

The evidence in Table 1 shows this is not the case. The *patron* indicator is a proxy for low political competition, and even after including this covariate in the regression we still find party organization has a negative impact on Liberal dynastic incidence. Further, Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix show the negative effect of local party organization on the demand for dynasts is robust to controlling for two additional proxies of competition: the lag of a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of vote fragmentation across candidates and an indicator variable for whether a race for a seat in the Commons was unopposed. Finally, Appendix B shows dynastic politicians reported a larger personal vote, indicating they had valuable resources parties could use to secure a victory at the polls.

[18]To compute the point estimate for the effect of organizations on dynastic incidence, I calculated the difference in the predicted probability of a dynast running for office between constituencies with and without associations based on the regression results reported in Column 6 of Table 1. The uncertainty estimates are obtained through the quasi-Bayesian approach described in (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, 2000). I employ this procedure throughout the paper to compute quantities of interest from binomial regressions.

	Liberal Dynastic Candidate									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Organization	−0.749**	−0.519	−0.584	−0.505	−0.556	−0.960***	−0.769**	−0.849**	−0.768*	−0.781*
	(0.355)	(0.365)	(0.370)	(0.389)	(0.393)	(0.372)	(0.381)	(0.390)	(0.409)	(0.402)
Borough	−0.058	−0.160	−0.038	−0.177	−0.351	−0.422	−0.484	−0.373	−0.535	−0.667
	(0.303)	(0.312)	(0.327)	(0.435)	(0.429)	(0.340)	(0.347)	(0.361)	(0.471)	(0.459)
Patron (L)		1.572***	1.597***	1.559***	1.482***		1.210**	1.219**	1.106**	1.064**
		(0.469)	(0.472)	(0.517)	(0.480)		(0.491)	(0.493)	(0.528)	(0.503)
Total Seats			0.341	0.452	0.388			0.350	0.668*	0.464
			(0.260)	(0.321)	(0.315)			(0.300)	(0.386)	(0.363)
Log(Population$_{71}$)				−0.050	−0.095				−0.090	−0.173
				(0.239)	(0.174)				(0.249)	(0.177)
Log(Δ Elec.$_{68-65}$)				−0.075					−0.123	
				(0.161)					(0.175)	
Δ Electorate$_{68-65}$ (Share Electorate$_{65}$)					0.132					0.081
					(0.498)					(0.523)
Intercept	−0.660***	−0.797***	−1.478**	−0.581	−0.267	−0.009	−0.143	−0.826	0.434	1.086
	(0.247)	(0.256)	(0.583)	(2.034)	(1.789)	(0.286)	(0.294)	(0.657)	(2.088)	(1.828)
Observations	273	273	273	239	243	215	215	215	192	196
Log Likelihood	−207.062	−198.083	−196.790	−173.738	−177.619	−169.008	−164.139	−163.105	−145.434	−150.300
Akaike Inf. Crit.	420.124	404.165	403.580	361.475	369.238	344.016	336.278	336.210	304.869	314.600
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1: **Party Strength and Probability of Liberal Dynastic Candidates.** The table reports binomial regression estimates for the relationship between Liberal party strength (*Organization*) and the probability of a dynastic politician running for office in the 1880 general election. Columns (1)-(5) report results based on the full sample of races. The estimates show the presence of local party organizations is negatively correlated with the probability of dynastic candidates running for office. Columns (6)-(10) show this finding is robust to the sample of races where the dynastic status of all candidates is known and controlling for a variety of confounders.

	Conservative Dynastic Candidate									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Organization	−0.444	−0.200	−0.182	0.073	0.166	−0.458	−0.223	−0.191	0.041	0.147
	(0.275)	(0.289)	(0.294)	(0.359)	(0.345)	(0.293)	(0.308)	(0.312)	(0.384)	(0.367)
Borough	−1.218***	−1.288***	−1.333***	−1.865***	−1.754***	−1.010***	−1.094***	−1.167***	−1.343**	−1.539***
	(0.273)	(0.283)	(0.313)	(0.569)	(0.542)	(0.291)	(0.301)	(0.329)	(0.587)	(0.549)
Patron (C)		1.527***	1.506***	1.050*	1.248***		1.355***	1.319***	0.937*	1.133**
		(0.430)	(0.434)	(0.558)	(0.447)		(0.439)	(0.442)	(0.565)	(0.461)
Total Seats			−0.102	0.434	0.145			−0.177	0.148	0.071
			(0.293)	(0.398)	(0.351)			(0.312)	(0.429)	(0.378)
Log(Population$_{71}$)				−0.236	−0.450*				−0.003	−0.380
				(0.318)	(0.248)				(0.348)	(0.263)
Log(Δ Elec.$_{68-65}$)				−0.254					−0.266	
				(0.169)					(0.186)	
Δ Electorate$_{68-65}$ (Share Electorate$_{65}$)					−0.334					−0.222
					(0.475)					(0.505)
Intercept	0.238	−0.035	0.168	3.467	4.709*	0.345	0.080	0.433	1.439	4.169
	(0.213)	(0.229)	(0.630)	(2.924)	(2.575)	(0.225)	(0.242)	(0.667)	(3.125)	(2.702)
Observations	271	271	271	214	238	215	215	215	165	189
Log Likelihood	−203.697	−193.566	−193.476	−139.733	−166.716	−174.595	−166.892	−166.647	−121.750	−144.017
Akaike Inf. Crit.	413.394	395.133	396.952	293.467	347.433	355.190	341.785	343.294	257.501	302.035
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: **Party Strength and Probability of Conservative Dynastic Candidates.** This table reports binomial regression estimates for the relationship between Conservative party strength (*Organization*) and the probability of a dynastic politician running for office in the 1874 general election across the same set of specifications reported in Table 1. Although the table shows the presence of local party organizations is negatively correlated with the probability of dynastic candidates running for office, the point estimates are not statistically significant.

Table 2 reports regression estimates for the Conservative party. The negative point estimate for *Organization* in Column (1) indicates dynastic candidates were less likely to run for office in constituencies where the party reported an organizational presence. However, the estimate for the impact of party strength is not statistically significant. Ziblatt (2017) shows Conservative local organizations were ineffectual in the pre-1880 period. The lack of relationship between the presence of associations and the demand for Conservative dynastic candidates provides further support for this view.

I also implement a placebo test to address the potential endogenous relationship between party organizations and the incidence of dynastic candidates. If the argument I advance is correct, we should expect the presence of organizations to have a negative effect on the incidence of dynastic only after the expansion of the franchise in 1867. As noted above, the reform gave parties an incentive to invest in organizations, and only when these organizations appeared post-1867, they should have had a negative impact on the demand for dynasts. Instead, if organizations are simply endogenous to the type of candidates running for office, they should be correlated with the presence of dynasts prior to 1867.

To assess these claims, I fit a set of binomial regressions across several specifications for the following election years: 1859, 1865, 1868, 1874, and 1880. As in the previous analyses constituencies are the unit of analysis, with the total number dynastic candidates running for office as the outcome, and a binary indicator for the presence of local organization as the main predictor. I fit these regressions for the Liberal and Conservative parties separately.

The estimates in Figure 2 are consistent with the claim that party organizations have a negative impact on the incidence of dynastic candidates and not the other way around. The figure plots, for each party, point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of the difference in the probability of a dynast running for office between constituencies with and without local organizations.

The top panel shows that among Liberals the presence of organizations is associated with a 13-20 percentage-point decline in the probability of a dynast running for office. The



Figure 2: **Placebo Test for Impact of Party Organizational Strength on Dynastic Incidence.** The figure plots differences in the predicted probability (and 95% confidence interval) of a dynastic candidate running for office between constituencies with and without local organizations across five general elections (top panel for Liberals and bottom panel for Conservatives).

negative relationship between organizational presence and dynastic incidence becomes statistically significant only following the expansion of the franchise in 1867.[19] The estimates for Liberals also show the introduction of the secret ballot cannot explain the findings discussed in this section, as organizations have a negative impact on incidence of dynastic candidates in 1868 – 4 years before the introduction of the secret ballot.[20] The bottom panel shows party organizations are associated with a 7 to 13 percentage-points decline in the incidence of Conservative dynastic candidates in the election of 1874, the year coinciding with the publication of the party's survey of local organizations, and in the subsequent election. However, as before, the estimates for Conservatives are not statistically significant.

The results presented in this section are consistent with the theory and historical context discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Following the Second Reform Act, and the ensuing expansion of the franchise, parties had an incentive to invest in organizations. Once these organizations came into place, a party's need for the electoral resources of dynasts diminished. In addition, the presence of organizations eroded the bargaining power of members of political dynasties relative to the party. However, only Liberals were able to develop effective organizations and "professionalize" the party, thereby explaining the negative relationship between local party organizations and the incidence of dynastic candidates.

[19]One reason for the negative relationship between affiliation to the NLF in 1880 and the incidence of dynastic candidates in the two prior elections is that the existence of many (if not all) Liberal local associations predated the formation of the National Liberal Federation (Herrick, 1945). Several of these organizations were founded after 1832 to make sure the rosters of registered voters were up to date. However, it is only after 1867, and the founding of the Birmingham "caucus," that parties relied on these organizations to mobilize voters.

[20]Further, if the secret ballot matters for the power of dynasts, one would expect any negative effect to be larger in rural (counties) relative to urban (borough) constituencies, where land was one of the main sources of political power. However, Figure 10 in the Appendix shows that the share of dynastic MPs in counties remains relatively constant in the two elections (1874 and 1880) following the reform. Similarly, although the difference-in-difference estimate of the share of dynastic candidates between counties and boroughs following the introduction of the secret ballot is negative, it is not statistically significant at conventional levels (see Table 7 in the Appendix).

6 Political Dynasties and Party Cohesion

This section focuses on key divisions (roll-calls) in the House of Commons to show Liberal dynastic MPs dissented more frequently from the party line relative to their non-dynastic peers. The section also shows dissent rates among Conservative dynastic MPs were similar to those reported by their non-dynastic co-partisans. These findings provide further evidence Liberals were the only party to develop effective organizations, and to experience a significant change in party leadership, making the trade-off in selecting dynastic candidates particularly stark.

6.1 Measuring Partisan Dissent in the House of Commons

My analysis focuses on partisan divisions to test whether dynastic MPs were more likely to dissent from the party line. Partisan divisions are those in which the chief whip of the two major parties acted as the teller.

Focusing on partisan divisions has two main advantages. First, following the existing literature, one can measure party preferences with the direction of the whip's vote in these divisions (Eggers and Spirling, 2016; Kam, 2009). Second, partisan divisions were more likely to have commanded the electorate's attention, thereby increasing the importance of maintaining party unity for leaders. The second consideration is particularly important in the British context. Reflecting the rise of cabinet government, the share of government divisions (i.e., those where the chief whip of the party in government was the teller) increased steadily throughout the 19th century, representing about 90 percent of the total by the end of the period (Cox, 1992). However, the majority of these divisions were simply procedural, and it is likely that voters paid little attention to these roll-calls. Instead, focusing on divisions where both whips were tellers guarantees one is analyzing votes the electorate cared about, and over which parties wanted to display a united front. Indeed, as discussed in Kam (2009, ch. 6), it is not the frequency of dissent but its salience that hurts party brands.

The sample I analyze includes all partisan divisions of the three parliaments in session

during the years 1868-1885. For each division and party, I code the party line as aye (or nay) if its whip voted aye (or nay).[21] The total number of divisions in the sample for the three parliaments is 25, 34, and 94 respectively. To measure dissent, I code for each division and legislator a binary indicator taking the value of one if his vote is different from that of the party line and zero otherwise.[22] The final data comprises 865 unique MPs and a total of 1,372 votes.

6.2 Dynasts and Party Dissent in the House of Commons

To test whether dynastic MPs were more likely to dissent from the party line, I fit a set of binomial regressions where the outcome is the number of times a legislator voted against the whip.[23] The main predictor in these regressions is a binary indicator taking the value of one if an MP is dynastic and zero otherwise. As additional controls I include binary indicators for the presence of a local organization, the existence of a patron in a constituency, and for the type of constituency MPs represent. The regressions also include an interaction between the dynastic and patron variables (to test whether dynasts backed by a strong relative report a higher dissent rates), and parliament random effects.[24] I fit these regression for the Conservative and Liberal parties separately.

Table 3 reports the results for Liberals. The estimate for the dynastic status of MPs is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. The regression estimates imply Liberal dynastic MPs were 0.4 percentage points more likely to dissent from the party line relative to non-dynastic legislators (with a [-0.09, 0.95] 95% confidence interval).[25] The effect

[21] To determine the identity of the chief whip, Eggers and Spirling (2016) checked whether his name was listed as one of the tellers in the division. When the name of the chief whip in a given division did not correspond to someone who served as MP, the authors assume that the whip was the previous or subsequent chief whip. For more details on the specific coding see Eggers and Spirling (ibid., p.6)

[22] Following Eggers and Spirling (ibid.) and Kam (2009), I treat missing votes as absences because it is impossible to determine whether the missing votes were purposeful or not.

[23] I fit binomial regressions to account for the fact that not all MPs cast the same number of votes. As before, all regressions account for overdispersion.

[24] I do not include legislator random effects because 61% and 55% of Liberal and Conservative MPs in the sample, respectively, cast only one vote parliament. This makes it difficult to identify legislator random effects.

[25] Point and uncertainty estimates for the effect of dynastic status on dissent rates are based on the regression results reported in Column 5 of Table 3.

of dynastic status on the likelihood of dissent is stronger among legislators backed by patrons (Column 4); MPs in this category were 4 percentage points more likely to deviate from the party line (with a [3.07, 6.5] 95% confidence interval).[26] These estimates are robust to the type of constituency a legislator represents (Column 5), and the inclusion of parliament random effects (Column 6).[27]

Finally, note that MPs representing constituencies affiliated with the NLF reported a lower propensity to dissent. This could be because the party leadership used local organizations to discipline its members. In this way, the result provides further support to the view that the Liberal party had developed strong organizations prior to 1880. The finding also contrasts with evidence from other contexts where a proxy for organizations (i.e., participation of parties in local electoral contexts) has been found to bolster the independence of legislators in parliament (Tavits, 2011, 2013).

Table 4 reports regression estimates for Conservatives. The table shows a negative and statistically significant relationship between the dynastic status of MPs and their propensity to dissent from the partly line relative to non-dynastic legislators. The estimates imply dynastic legislators were half a percentage point *less* likely to dissent from the party line in partisan divisions (with a [-0.95, -0.08] 95% confidence interval).[28] Further, there is no evidence patrons magnified the propensity of dynasts to dissent from (or conform with) the party whip (Column 4-6).[29] Finally, in contrast to Liberals, local organizations do not predict a legislator's probability of dissent, which provides further support to the view that

[26]The magnitude of these estimates is larger than in other contexts. For example, the propensity of "mavericks" (i.e., politicians serving in local office prior to holding a seat in parliament) to dissent from the party majority ranges from one-third of a percentage point to one percentage point (Tavits, 2009, p. 807).

[27]Ideology may confound the impact of a legislator's dynastic background on his propensity to dissent. To address this issue, I created an indicator variable (*whig*) taking the value of one if a legislator identified himself as a whig, liberal-conservative, moderate liberal, or independent liberal as recorded in Stenton (1976) and Stenton and Lees (1978). Table 8 in the Appendix shows that after accounting for a legislator's faction, the dynastic background of politicians still predicts higher dissent rates. The table also shows belonging to a faction did not translate directly into a higher dissent propensity, as the coefficient for *whig* is only significant when interacted with the dynastic background of MPs.

[28]The estimates are based on the regression results reported in Column (5) of Table 4.

[29]The findings reported in Table 4 are substantially similar when restricting the sample to legislators that represented boroughs.

	Probability of Vote Against Party Line					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dynastic	0.634***	0.543***	0.377***	0.232*	0.253**	0.240*
	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.138)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(0.129)
Organization (L)		−0.545***	−0.347**	−0.373***	−0.412***	−0.408***
		(0.170)	(0.176)	(0.177)	(0.180)	(0.147)
Patron (L)			1.033***	0.428	0.420	0.420
			(0.161)	(0.362)	(0.362)	(0.295)
Dynastic * Patron (L)				0.802**	0.797**	0.796**
				(0.402)	(0.402)	(0.328)
Borough					0.175	0.150
					(0.162)	(0.133)
Intercept	−4.382***	−4.207***	−4.352***	−4.283***	−4.416***	−4.322***
	(0.095)	(0.105)	(0.112)	(0.114)	(0.170)	(0.193)
Parliament RE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	698	698	698	698	698	698

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: **Dynastic Status and Probability of Dissent among Liberals.** The table reports binomial regression estimates of the relationship between the dynastic status of Liberal MPs and their probability of voting against the party whip in partisan divisions. The point estimate of *Dynastic* is positive, indicating dynastic MPs are more likely to vote against their non-dynastic counterparts. The magnitude of the estimates is larger for patron-backed MPs. These results are robust to a variety of controls and regression specifications.

Conservative local associations were ineffective prior to 1880 (see Ch. 5 Cox, 1987; Ziblatt, 2017).

Overall, this section shows the trade-off involved in relying on dynastic politicians for the Liberal party was particularly stark; dynasts provided the resources necessary to win elections in places where the party lacked organizations, but this came at the cost of less unity in important divisions in parliament. This dynamic undermined the Liberal party brand, which was necessary to woo the newly enfranchised urban working class. Indeed, Appendix F shows Liberal dynastic MPs started dissenting from the party line only after 1867, which coincides with the emergence of strong Liberal local organizations and the ascendance of the Radical wing to the party leadership. By contrast, Conservative dynastic legislators did not deviate from the party line throughout the period examined (1859-1880), confirming

	Probability of Vote Against Party Line					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dynastic	−0.747***	−0.716***	−0.685***	−0.679***	−0.582***	−0.508**
	(0.243)	(0.245)	(0.245)	(0.258)	(0.265)	(0.215)
Organization (C)		0.145	0.085	0.086	0.029	0.037
		(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.115)
Patron (C)			−0.695**	−0.671	−0.733*	−0.662
			(0.414)	(0.529)	(0.531)	(0.430)
Dynastic * Patron (C)				−0.062	−0.126	−0.269
				(0.834)	(0.835)	(0.678)
Borough					0.388**	0.453**
					(0.236)	(0.192)
Intercept	−4.695***	−4.804***	−4.692***	−4.695***	−4.860***	−4.897***
	(0.131)	(0.169)	(0.177)	(0.179)	(0.212)	(0.550)
Parliament RE	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	678	678	678	678	678	678

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: **Dynastic Status and Probability of Dissent among Conservatives.** The table reports binomial regression estimates of the relationship between the dynastic status of Conservative MPs and their probability of voting against the party whip in partisan divisions. The point estimate of *Dynastic* is negative, indicating dynastic MPs were less likely to vote against their non-dynastic counterparts. This result is robust to controlling for a variety of controls and regression specifications.

the inefficacy of the party's local organizations and the status of the old traditional elite in charge of the party leadership (Ziblatt, 2017).

7 Conclusion

Building on the party strength literature (see, for example, Caramani, 2004; Panebianco, 1988; Tavits, 2013; Ziblatt, 2017), this paper introduces a theoretical framework to explain the incidence of dynastic candidates in democracies. It argues that the key distinguishing feature of dynastic politicians is their advantage in electoral resources. However, because they may provide less party discipline, political parties only rely on them to run in districts where they are weak.

The paper tests this theory in the context of Victorian Britain and finds the following.

First, in the aftermath of the Second Reform Act, Liberal dynastic candidates were less likely to run in constituencies where a local organization was present. This happened because the presence of organizations made the resources of dynastic politicians less valuable to win office. Second, an analysis of roll calls in the post 1867 period shows Liberal dynastic MPs were more likely to dissent from the party line. Together, the evidence suggests the dynastic trade-off was particularly stark for Liberals because they had developed effective organizations and the agenda of the party leadership threatened the interests of the politicians they needed to win in places without organizations. Finally, among Conservatives, party strength does not predict the incidence of dynasts, and dynastic MPs do not exhibit significantly different behavior in parliament relative to their non-dynastic counterparts. These findings provide further evidence to the view that Conservatives remained an elite party with ineffectual local organizations (Ziblatt, 2017).

In the context of Victorian Britain, political dynasties represented a form of a traditional elite. The findings in the paper, therefore, show the development of parties is key to bringing about their demise. The findings in the paper also have implications for our understanding of the development of political parties and the persistence of political dynasties in democracies. Together, the results suggest dynasties persist and survive electoral reforms (Querubin, 2011) as long as parties fail to become institutionalized. In addition, this paper shows that in a context of overall party weakness, and contrary to evidence on financial markets (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006), academic settings (Durante, Labartino, and Perotti, 2011), and the US Congress (E. Dal Bo, P. Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009), political dynasties serve a function (making up for the electoral deficiencies of parties), and are not simply the result of nepotism.

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This is a supplementary appendix to Carlos Velasco Rivera,"Political Dynasties and Party Strength: Evidence from Victorian Britain." Sections, figures, and tables are referenced in the main paper.

A Candidate Bargaining Power and Mobility

This section discusses how endowing candidates with bargaining power and agency regarding whether to accept a party's nomination decisions does not affect the main prediction of my theory. The discussion also shows that my prediction does not change even when allowing for candidate mobility.

Candidate Bargaining Power

The theory I introduced in section 2 of the paper does not endow candidates with agency over whether to accept the party's nomination decision. However, introducing this additional element to the theory does not change its main prediction. To see why this is the case, suppose that candidates have bargaining power in relation to the party leadership. Candidates may find desirable to run under a party banner not only because of a party's electoral resources, but also because doing so may allow them to have access to coveted positions in parliament, or extract higher rents. However, assume that a candidate's bargaining power depends on the electoral resources at his disposal and the local organizational strength of a party. In particular, suppose that given their electoral advantage, dynastic politicians have a higher bargaining power in relation to their non-dynastic counterparts, and that the bargaining power of candidates decreases when local party organizations are present in a constituency. Given these assumptions, let's consider the type of candidate nominations in equilibrium under two scenarios: when local organizations are present and when local organizations are absent.

Case 1: Outcome under Local Organizations Suppose that there is a local organization present in a constituency, and suppose that the party decides to give the party ticket nomination to a non-dynastic candidate. In this scenario, the dynastic candidate can either choose to accept the party's decision or choose to run as an independent. If he chooses to run as an independent, his electoral prospects may not be very high as the party has a strong organization to fight off candidates running with their own resources in an electoral race. When this happens, dynastic candidates risk losing an election and incurring some cost for having participated in the race. As a result, it may be in his advantage to accept the party's nomination of the non-dynastic candidate and not run for office.

Case 2: Outcome under No Local Organizations Now suppose that the party lacks local organization in a given constituency, and that it still decides to give the nomination to a non-dynastic candidate. In this scenario, the dynastic candidate can either choose to accept the party's decision, or choose to run as an independent. If he chooses to run as an independent, he has good electoral prospects as the party's candidate lacks organization and resources of his own to beat the dynastic politician. In this scenario, the party then is better off choosing the dynastic politician to run under the party banner.

Together, these two cases show that the theory still predicts that dynastic candidates will be more likely to run in constituencies where parties are organizationally weak even after allowing for candidate agency to decide whether to accept a party's nomination decision.

Candidate Mobility

Note also that the theoretical framework discussed so far does not rely on candidates being mobile. The discussion only requires that in a given constituency there is a supply of dynastic candidates. Under this assumption, when a party does not grant the nomination to a dynastic candidate implies that in the current period the dynastic politician will be out of office. It is possible that in a future election he may are may not be called to run for office again.

If we allow for some candidate mobility, the theory's main prediction does not change. To see why this is the case, suppose that some dynastic candidates have the ability to compete in different constituencies (this could happen, if for example, they have a national brand that allows them to be recognized in constituencies different from the ones from where there relatives originally ran for office). Now consider a simple case in which there are two constituencies: one where there is a party organization and another where none exists. The party has now to consider the nominations across these two constituencies. In this scenario, it is easy to see, by the discussion above, that in equilibrium the dynastic candidate will run in the constituency where the party is weak and the non-dynastic candidate in the constituency where the party has an organizational presence.

B Dynastic Advantage in Victorian Britain

This section provides evidence showing dynastic politicians had an electoral advantage over their non-dynastic counterparts. First I show that members of political dynasties were more likely to be elected without facing electoral competition. I then show that in the races in which dynastic candidates faced electoral competition they were also able to capture a higher proportion of the party vote.



Figure 1: **Dynastic Politicians and Deterrence of Electoral Competition Across Time.** The left panel plots the percent of MPs elected without facing opponents by dynastic status over the course of the 19th century. The right panel reports the differences in unopposed rates between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs.

Figure 1 displays the main findings regarding the ability of dynastic politicians to deter political competition in Victorian Britain. The left panel of Figure 1 plots the proportion of MPs elected without facing opposition by their dynastic status. As noted in Eggers and Spirling (2014), the series show a secular decline in the proportion of uncontested races throughout the period. Here I add that dynastic MPs were 10 percentage points more likely to be elected unopposed in relation to their non-dynastic counterparts. The right panel shows that the difference in unopposed rates is statistically significant and remained virtually constant across most of the century.

Figure 2 shows that the gap in the proportion of contested races between dynastic and non-dynastic politicians in driven by pattern of electoral competition in the boroughs. In addition, Table 1 shows that the presence of patrons (a proxy for the amount of resources that dynastic politicians had at their disposal) is strongly correlated with the probability of a dynastic candidate elected without opposition. Together, these findings suggest that dynastic candidates used their resources to deter political competition.



Figure 2: **Unopposed Rates by Dynastic Background and Constituency Type.** The figure plots the perecent of dynastic and non-dynastic MPs elected without facing opposition in boroughs (left panel) and counties (right panel). Consistent with the deterrence mechanism, the figure shows that in boroughs (where the barriers to entry were significantly lower) dynastic MPs were more likely to run unopposed relative to their non-dynastic MPs. The figure also shows that in counties unopposed rates between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs were virtually the same.

I also provide evidence that dynastic politicians enjoyed an electoral advantage when they faced electoral competition. To show this, I focus on races in two-member constituencies in the three general elections following the Second Reform Act (i.e., 1868, 1874 and 1880). From this set, I analyze those in which more than one candidate ran for office under the same party banner and at least one of them was dynastic. Focusing on this set of races allows me to make comparisons between candidates within parties. In the analysis that follows I show that dynastic candidates captured a higher proportion of the party vote.

My analysis begins by examining differences in party vote share between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates within parties. As an alternative, I fit OLS regressions to predict a candidate's party vote share as a function of his dynastic background, incumbency status, the number of terms he served in office prior to a given race, party affiliation, the type of constituency in which a race took place, presence of a Conservative or Liberal patron in the constituency, electoral size, and year fixed effects. As discussed in section 4, I am not able to ascertain the dynastic background of candidates who were never elected to office (these are dropped from the analysis). Thus, I repeat the analysis relying on the sample of races where the dynastic status of every candidate is known.[1]

[1]Figure 8 in the Appendix shows that races in the restricted sample are relatively similar to those in the population of races across a wide variety of dimensions. Only for Conservatives the restricted sample tends to include constituencies with a higher share of Conservative patrons and lower Liberal organizational

	Unopposed Dynastic Candidate (1868 - 1880)					
	(C)	(C)	(L)	(L)	(L)	(C)
Patron (C)	0.478***	0.502***	0.066			
	(0.118)	(0.118)	(0.130)			
Log(Population)		0.020			0.014	
		(0.016)			(0.022)	
Patron (L)				0.236**	0.253**	−0.087***
				(0.120)	(0.121)	(0.023)
Intercept	0.022*	−0.182	0.116***	0.097***	−0.046	0.087***
	(0.012)	(0.155)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.224)	(0.023)
Observations	159	157	183	183	180	159
R^2	0.335	0.341	0.002	0.047	0.053	0.005
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 1: **Patrons and Unopposed Dynastic Candidates in Boroughs (1868-1880).** The table reports OLS estimates for the relationship between the presence of a Conservative (and Liberal) patron and the probability of observing a Conservative (and Liberal) dynastic candidate run unopposed to office in the period 1868-1880. Columns (1)-(2) show that the presence of a Conservative patrons is positively correlated with the probability of observing a conservative dynastic candidate run unopposed for office, and Column (3) shows that their presence is not correlated with the probability of observing an unopposed Liberal dynastic candidate. Similarly, columns (4) and (5) show that the presence of a Liberal patron is positively correlated with the probability of observing a Liberal dynastic candidate run unopposed, and column (6) shows that it is negatively correlated with the probability of observing a Conservative dynastic candidate running unopposed. These estimates suggest that the backing of a patron explains the presence of unopposed dynastic candidates in boroughs.

Figure 3 reports point estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) of the impact of dynastic status of candidates on the proportion of party vote they capture.[2] The solid and dashed lines report estimates based on the full and restricted samples respectively. The estimates show that dynastic candidates tended to capture an additional 1-2 percentage points of the party vote share in relation to their non-dynastic counterparts. This finding is robust across all specifications and the two samples considered in the analysis. In addition, Figure 4 in Appendix reports the results of a sensitivity analysis showing that over 70 percent of the candidates with a missing background would have to be dynastic to make the personal vote advantage of dynastic politicians disappear. One can interpret this finding as the size of

strength.

[2]Table 2 in Appendix D reports all regression details.

the personal vote of dynastic candidates. The size of the personal vote reported here is strikingly similar to the one estimated for members of the House of Representatives in the United States around the same period (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2000).



Figure 3: **Personal Vote of Dynastic Candidates.** The figure reports point estimates and 95% confidence interval for the difference in party vote share between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates in electoral races in two-member districts.

Why did dynastic candidates capture a higher fraction of the party vote in two-member constituencies? I argue that this had to do with the prevailing electoral rules at the time and the personal-resource advantage of dynastic candidates. Registered electors in two-member constituencies had two votes. Electors could either give their votes to the candidates of the same party, split them among the candidates of two different parties, or plump (i.e., use only one vote for any of the candidates on the ballot) (Cox, 1987, p. 95). This rule ensured that partisanship alone would not guarantee electoral success and gave an advantage to candidates with the ability to cultivate their personal vote.

Dynastic politicians were in a better position to cultivate a personal following. A voter deciding to give his vote either to a Conservative non-dynast or a dynast may have opted for the latter simply because of his higher name recognition. Dynastic politicians were also more likely to come from wealthy land-owning families. This privileged position may have allowed them better access to resources that they could use for patronage, a common practice in Victorian Britain to secure victory at the polls (Kam, 2009; O'Leary, 1962). To support this claim, in Table 10 of Appendix E I focus on amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1885 and show that, irrespective of their partisan affiliation, dynastic legislators were more likely to oppose (support) provisions restricting (protecting) patronage.



Figure 4: **Sensitivity of Dynastic Personal Vote Advantage to Missing Background of Candidates.** The figures plots the estimate (and 95% confidence interval) of the magnitude of the dynastic personal vote advantage as a function of the proportion of candidates with a missing background who are randomly coded as dynastic. All estimates are based on a regression that controls for the incumbency status of candidates, party affiliation, type of constituency in which a race takes place, presence of a patron in a constituency, size of the electorate, and year fixed effects. The plot shows that over 70 percent of candidates whose background is not known would have to dynastic for the dynastic advantage to disappear.

C Origins of Party Organizations

Figure 5 shows party local organizations trace their origins to the absence of patrons and the expansion of the franchise following the Second Reform Act.[3] The left panel shows OLS estimates of the relationship between the presence of a patron and the probability of observing a party local organization for the Liberal and Conservative parties, respectively. Constituencies reporting the presence of a Liberal patron were 22 percentage points less likely to be affiliated to the NLF in 1880. Similarly, constituencies with an established Conservative patron were 35 percentage points less likely to report the presence of a Conservative party association in 1874.



Figure 5: **Endogenous Party Organizations.** The left panel reports OLS estimates (and 95% confidence intervals) of the difference in the probability of reporting at least one party association between constituencies with and without the presence of a patron across parties. The right panel plots the predicted probability (and 95% confidence intervals) of constituencies reporting the presence of a local organization against the log of the change in electorate size following the Second Reform Act.

The right panel in Figure 5 shows for each party a positive relationship between the log of the change in the size of the franchise following the Reform Act of 1867 and the probability that a constituency reports a local organization. The estimates from this analysis imply that a constituency doubling its electorate size was about 45 percentage points more likely to report the presence of an organization.

[3]Table 3 in Appendix D reports OLS regression estimates and sample characteristics.

D Additional Figures and Table



Figure 6: **Proportion of Dynastic MPs by Political Party (1832 -1885).** The left panel plots of the proportion of dynastic MPs in the Conservative and Liberal parties. The right panel report the difference in the proportion (and 95% confidence interval) of dynastic MPs between the Conservative and Liberal parties. The panels show that the Liberal party experienced a significant decline in the share of dynastic MPs following the Second Reform Act of 1867.



Figure 7: **Family Ties between Patrons and MPs.** The figure plots the proportion of MPs related to the patron in the constituency they represent across parties. The share of all dynastic MPs related to patrons in their constituency is 61 percent. Among Conservatives the proportion of MPs related to patrons is 73 percent.



Figure 8: **Representatives of Restricted Sample Across Parties.** The figure plots standardized differences in key covariates between constituencies where the dynastic background of all candidates is know and those in which at least one of the candidates were never elected to office. The left panel reports results for Conservatives and the right panel for Liberals.

	Share of Party Vote							
	Full Sample				Restricted Sample			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dynastic	0.013**	0.019***	0.019***	0.019***	0.011**	0.015**	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Incumbent			0.021***	0.021***			0.008	0.007
			(0.008)	(0.008)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Terms			−0.005	−0.005			−0.003	−0.003
			(0.003)	(0.003)			(0.003)	(0.003)
Liberal			−0.004	−0.003			−0.010**	−0.009**
			(0.006)	(0.006)			(0.005)	(0.005)
Borough			−0.009	−0.009			−0.019***	−0.019***
			(0.006)	(0.006)			(0.006)	(0.007)
Patron (L)			−0.026*	−0.027*			−0.034**	−0.036**
			(0.016)	(0.016)			(0.016)	(0.016)
Patron (C)			−0.021	−0.021			0.010	0.008
			(0.041)	(0.041)			(0.022)	(0.023)
Log(Electors)			−0.004	−0.004			−0.001	−0.001
			(0.005)	(0.005)			(0.006)	(0.006)
Intercept	0.480***	0.480***	0.522***	0.519***	0.482***	0.482***	0.514***	0.514***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.053)	(0.052)
Year FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	203	415	415	415	120	245	245	245
R^2		0.025	0.073	0.081		0.024	0.125	0.131
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: **Share of Party Vote for Dynastic Candidates in Two-Member Constituencies (1868-1880).** The table displays the average difference in party vote share between dynastic and non-dynastic candidates in the three general elections in the period 1868-1880. Columns (1)-(4) report the results relying on the sample of races where there was at least one candidate candidates whose dynastic background is not known because they were never elected to office (these were dropped from the analysis). Columns (5)-(9) report the estimates for the sample that only includes races where the background of every candidate is known. The first column reports the results where the unit of analysis is the co-partisan pair (dynastic vs. non-dynastic). Columns (2)-(4) report the results for OLS specifications where the unit of analysis is the candidate. The point estimates show that on average dynastic candidates a 1-2 percentage point advantage relative to non-dynastic candidates. All estimates are robust to the incumbency status of candidates, number of terms they had served in office, party affiliation, type of constituency where candidates compete, presence of a parton, size of the electorate, time trends, and limiting the analysis to races where the background of all candidates is known.

	Pr(Liberal Org.)			Pr(Conservative Org.)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Patron (L)	-0.225^{**}		-0.187^{**}			
	(0.089)		(0.086)			
Log(Δ Elec.$_{68-65}$)		0.137^{***}	0.217^{***}		0.201^{***}	0.227^{***}
		(0.024)	(0.036)		(0.028)	(0.043)
Log(Population$_{71}$)			-0.098^{***}			-0.053
			(0.030)			(0.035)
Patron (C)				-0.351^{***}		-0.228^{***}
				(0.087)		(0.085)
Intercept	0.225^{***}	-0.796^{***}	-0.352^{*}	0.518^{***}	-1.024^{***}	-0.634^{**}
	(0.024)	(0.181)	(0.214)	(0.030)	(0.212)	(0.257)
Observations	293	252	251	293	252	251
R^2	0.021	0.113	0.163	0.053	0.167	0.198

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: **Endogenous Party Organizations.** The table reports OLS regression estimates of the relationship between a constituency reporting a local Liberal (Columns 1-3) or Conservative (Columns 4-6) party organization and the presence of a patron, the log of franchise expansion following the Second Reform Act, and log population. The estimates show a negative relationship between the presence of patrons and the probability of observing a party organization, and a positive correlation between the outcome of interest and the log magnitude in the expansion of the franchise.



Figure 9: **Percent of Dynastic MPs Representing Unfamiliar Constituencies (1832-1885).** The figure plots the percent of MPs serving in constituencies not previously represented by them or a family member.

	Liberal Dynastic Candidate									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Organization	−0.696*	−0.465	−0.542	−0.462	−0.490	−0.894**	−0.692*	−0.766*	−0.691	−0.645
	(0.372)	(0.384)	(0.391)	(0.412)	(0.415)	(0.389)	(0.401)	(0.413)	(0.434)	(0.429)
Patron (L)		1.493***	1.522***	1.425**	1.376**		1.224**	1.233**	1.053*	1.008*
		(0.531)	(0.534)	(0.603)	(0.546)		(0.557)	(0.558)	(0.612)	(0.574)
Total Seats			0.339	0.558	0.497			0.276	0.693	0.482
			(0.287)	(0.355)	(0.362)			(0.344)	(0.432)	(0.433)
Log(Population$_{71}$)				−0.228	−0.194				−0.206	−0.264
				(0.287)	(0.193)				(0.293)	(0.197)
Log(Δ Elec.$_{68-65}$)				0.026					−0.066	
				(0.207)					(0.214)	
Δ Electorate$_{68-65}$ (Share Electorate$_{65}$)					0.170					0.027
					(0.515)					(0.537)
Intercept	−0.731***	−0.962***	−1.515***	0.286	0.195	−0.448**	−0.649***	−1.097*	0.701	1.311
	(0.186)	(0.210)	(0.520)	(2.002)	(1.674)	(0.199)	(0.223)	(0.605)	(2.038)	(1.721)
Observations	194	194	194	176	183	160	160	160	147	151
Log Likelihood	−145.116	−138.937	−137.887	−125.087	−131.757	−125.879	−122.076	−121.589	−110.654	−116.140
Akaike Inf. Crit.	294.232	283.875	283.773	262.173	275.514	255.758	250.151	251.178	233.308	244.281
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: **Party Strength and the Probability of Liberal Dynastic Candidates (Boroughs Only).** The table reports binomial regression estimates for the relationship between Liberal party strength (Organization) and the probability of a dynastic politician running for office in the 1880 general election in the sample of boroughs. Columns (1)-(5) report results based on the full sample of races. Columns (6)-(10) report estimates based on the sample of races where the dynastic status of all candidates is known. The estimates show that party strength is negatively correlated with the incidence of dynastic liberal candidates across all specifications in the restricted sample.

	Liberal Dynastic Candidate									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Organization	−0.917**	−0.712*	−0.719*	−0.658	−0.703*	−1.124***	−0.950**	−1.053**	−0.984**	−0.974**
	(0.378)	(0.387)	(0.388)	(0.406)	(0.410)	(0.394)	(0.403)	(0.414)	(0.431)	(0.428)
Borough	−0.305	−0.395	−0.367	−0.559	−0.537	−0.464	−0.530	−0.443	−0.691	−0.714
	(0.393)	(0.402)	(0.404)	(0.505)	(0.515)	(0.425)	(0.431)	(0.439)	(0.548)	(0.555)
Vote Share	−0.310	−0.225	2.450	1.574	2.896	0.316	0.409	5.116	4.741	5.455
Concentration (lag)	(1.327)	(1.359)	(2.618)	(2.808)	(2.727)	(1.452)	(1.473)	(3.231)	(3.485)	(3.376)
Patron (L)		1.464***	1.493***	1.422**	1.392**		1.191**	1.161**	0.991	0.985*
		(0.537)	(0.539)	(0.606)	(0.550)		(0.566)	(0.569)	(0.618)	(0.581)
Total Seats			0.659	0.673	0.810			1.230*	1.490*	1.452*
			(0.549)	(0.582)	(0.586)			(0.746)	(0.831)	(0.823)
Pop				−0.049	−0.125				−0.135	−0.222
				(0.247)	(0.183)				(0.259)	(0.187)
Log(Δ Elec.$_{68-65}$)				−0.118					−0.122	
				(0.172)					(0.185)	
Δ Electorate$_{68-65}$					0.106					0.048
(Share Electorate$_{65}$)					(0.510)					(0.532)
Intercept	−0.202	−0.351	−2.465	−0.778	−1.415	0.019	−0.127	−3.954*	−1.890	−1.841
	(0.541)	(0.555)	(1.851)	(2.882)	(2.787)	(0.597)	(0.609)	(2.397)	(3.139)	(3.028)
Observations	210	210	210	191	193	174	174	174	160	160
Log Likelihood	−164.553	−158.564	−157.490	−142.953	−145.995	−140.058	−136.481	−134.383	−122.899	−124.823
Akaike Inf. Crit.	337.105	327.127	326.980	301.905	307.99	288.116	282.961	280.767	261.797	265.646
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: **Party Strength and the Probability of Liberal Dynastic Candidates (Accounting for Vote Concentration as a Proxy of Political Competition).** The table reports binomial regression estimates for the relationship between Liberal party strength (Organization) and the probability of a dynastic politician running for office in the 1880 general election. Columns (1)-(5) report results based on the full sample of races. Columns (6)-(10) report estimates based on the sample of races where the dynastic status of all candidates is known. All regression control for the lag level of political competition in a constituency (proxied by a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of vote concentration). Even after accounting for political competition, the estimates show that party strength is negatively correlated with the incidence of dynastic liberal candidates.

	Liberal Dynastic Candidate									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Organization	−0.801**	−0.571	−0.625*	−0.537	−0.587	−0.996***	−0.806**	−0.879**	−0.791*	−0.809**
	(0.357)	(0.366)	(0.370)	(0.388)	(0.392)	(0.374)	(0.383)	(0.390)	(0.408)	(0.402)
Borough	−0.335	−0.463	−0.347	−0.518	−0.609	−0.560	−0.649*	−0.537	−0.703	−0.861*
	(0.341)	(0.351)	(0.365)	(0.469)	(0.465)	(0.367)	(0.376)	(0.390)	(0.494)	(0.490)
Unopposed (Lag)	−0.703*	−0.769*	−0.755*	−0.891*	−0.630	−0.440	−0.525	−0.510	−0.589	−0.553
	(0.395)	(0.407)	(0.409)	(0.458)	(0.437)	(0.430)	(0.441)	(0.443)	(0.494)	(0.473)
Patron (L)		1.619***	1.647***	1.639***	1.507***		1.254**	1.266**	1.171**	1.102**
		(0.476)	(0.480)	(0.529)	(0.485)		(0.495)	(0.499)	(0.536)	(0.508)
Total Seats			0.327	0.440	0.399			0.342	0.641*	0.470
			(0.263)	(0.324)	(0.317)			(0.303)	(0.388)	(0.365)
Pop				−0.071	−0.121				−0.111	−0.191
				(0.238)	(0.175)				(0.250)	(0.178)
Log(Δ Elec.$_{68-65}$)				−0.088					−0.118	
				(0.161)					(0.175)	
Δ Electorate$_{68-65}$ (Share Electorate$_{65}$)					0.106					0.078
					(0.500)					(0.525)
Intercept	−0.312	−0.422	−1.079*	0.139	0.304	0.176	0.072	−0.602	0.888	1.509
	(0.311)	(0.318)	(0.620)	(2.063)	(1.833)	(0.339)	(0.346)	(0.689)	(2.124)	(1.870)
Observations	273	273	273	239	243	215	215	215	192	196
Log Likelihood	−204.561	−195.248	−194.092	−170.659	−175.986	−168.202	−163.045	−162.077	−144.323	−149.237
Akaike Inf. Crit.	417.122	400.497	400.184	357.317	367.972	344.403	336.090	336.153	304.646	314.475
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: **Party Strength and the Probability of Liberal Dynastic Candidates (Accounting for Unopposed Races as a Proxy for Political Competition).** The table reports binomial regression estimates for the relationship between Liberal party strength (Organization) and the probability of a dynastic politician running for office in the 1880 general election. Columns (1)-(5) report results based on the full sample of races. Columns (6)-(10) report estimates based on the sample of races where the dynastic status of all candidates is known. All regression control for the lag level of political competition in a constituency (proxied by whether a candidate ran unopposed in the previous election). Even after accounting for political competition, the estimates show that party strength is negatively correlated with the incidence of dynastic liberal candidates.



Figure 10: **Proportion of Dynastic MPs by Constituency Type.**. The figure shows dynastic MPs were more likely to represent counties through most of the nineteenth century. The share of dynastic MPs in counties declined significantly only in the election of 1885.

	Liberals	Conservatives
Diff-in-Diff Estimate	-0.13	-0.11
Std.Error	0.08	0.07
p-value	0.13	0.11

Table 7: **Impact of Secret Ballot on Incidence of Dynastic Candidates by Party.** The table reports estimates for the difference-in-differences share of dynastic candidates between counties and boroughs following the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872 for the Liberal and Conservative parties. The estimates show a 11-13 percentage-points decline in the incidence of dynasts in counties relative to boroughs. The point estimates, however, are not significant at conventional levels.

	Probability of Vote Against Party Line				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dynastic	0.448***	0.277**	0.195	0.220*	0.219*
	(0.135)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.122)
Whig	1.891***	0.529	0.369	0.409	0.397
	(0.190)	(0.562)	(0.564)	(0.565)	(0.463)
Dynastic * Whig		1.768***	1.870***	1.845***	1.853***
		(0.602)	(0.603)	(0.604)	(0.493)
Organization (L)			−0.469***	−0.517***	−0.517***
			(0.176)	(0.179)	(0.146)
Borough				0.222	0.219
				(0.166)	(0.135)
Intercept	−4.446***	−4.366***	−4.207***	−4.379***	−4.367***
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.110)	(0.172)	(0.160)
Parliament RE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	676	676	676	676	676
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: **Dynastic Status and Probability of Dissent among Liberals by Party Faction.** The table reports maximum likelihood estimates from a binomial regression for the relationship between the dynastic status of Liberal MPs and their probability of voting against the party whip in partisan divisions after accounting for a legislator's party faction. Even after controlling for whether a legislator identified himself as Whig, we find that dynastic politicians were more likely to dissent from the party line. This finding shows that belonging to a whig faction is not a confounder for the dynastic status of legislators.

E Political Dynasties and Patronage

As argued and shown in the main paper, dynastic politicians enjoy an advantage in personal resources. Further, in the particular time period I examine, politicians had to spend significant amounts of resources to win and stay in office. The implication of the advantage assumption in the British context is that dynastic MPs should oppose any measure that poses a threat to the use of patronage and resources in order to win elections. To examine this claim, this section focuses on the Corruption and Illegal Practices Act of 1883. The debate in parliament surrounding this legislation offers a unique opportunity to examine the claim of interest. The purpose of the legislation was to curb excessive spending in electoral races, provide a clear definition on corrupt and illegal practices, and impose heavy penalties for incurring in them (O'Leary, 1962, p. 160). Therefore, one can learn about the means that dynastic politicians used to attain office by looking at how legislators of this type voted on specific provisions of the bill. This section focuses on four relevant amendments and provides evidence that independent of party affiliations, dynastic MPs were less likely to support clauses that would reduce the barriers to entry to electoral races and curb the use of patronage to secure the vote of constituents.

The impetus for the enactment of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 were the record number of electoral petitions (42) and the exorbitant level spending observed in the 1880 general election. This bill is considered as landmark in the British case since as Rix (2008, p. 66) notes, it "(...) not only provoked debates about corruption but also raised wider questions such as the composition of the Commons, the relationship between MPs and constituents and the role of party organisation." The analysis in this section focuses on the votes on specific amendments that can allow us to learn about how dynastic politicians relate to constituents, the source of their advantage, and whether they were less disciplined partisans in parliament.

To carry out this task, I selected four relevant amendments that were voted in the process of passing the legislation. Each of them was selected based on whether the substance of the amendment led to a clear prediction regarding the vote of dynastic MPs irrespective of their political affiliation. Table 9 provides the key characteristics of the four selected amendments analyzed in this section along with the predicted position of dynastic MPs. The first column provides the main goal of a given amendment. The second column provides the specific provision that was put to a vote, and the third column includes the position we would expect dynasts to take in relation to a given amendment.

The first row reports the information on the proposal that sought to reduce the barriers to entry to running for a seat in parliament. Under the status quo, candidates were required to pay the expenses incurred by the returning officer (the official in charge of the poll) (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1981, p.16). The amendment was aimed at ending this practice by relying on local taxes to defray these costs. This measure would have effectively reduced one of the barriers that potential candidates faced to enter a race. As such, the prediction is that dynastic MPs, all else equal, should oppose this amendment.

Another controversial issue in passing this legislation was that of paid conveyances (trans-

Type	Amendment Content	Prediction
Reduce Barriers to Entry	Include "That it be an Instruction to the Committee that they have power to insert a new Clause in the Bill charging the returning officer's expenses at Parliamentary Elections upon the rates in boroughs and counties."	Dynastic MPs Oppose
Restrict Conveyances	Include "No person shall lend a carriage or horse to any candidate, election committee, or agent, or to any other person for the purpose of conveying voters to or from the poll, and every person lending or borrowing a carriage or horse for the conveyance of voters to or from the poll shall be guilty of an illegal practice."	Dynastic MPs Oppose
Forbid Public Houses	Include "or any premises where any intoxicating liquor is sold"	Dynastic MPs Oppose
Allow Entertainment	Include "Nothing in this section shall prohibit any entertainment given by any person, in the nature of ordinary hospitality, which is not inconsistent with his usual mode of living, and which in any case is not of a corrupt nature or given with a corrupt motive."	Dynastic MPs Support

Table 9: **Predicted Position of Dynastic MPs on Selected Amendments to the Corrupt and Ilegal Practices Act of 1883.** The table displays the purpose, content, and predicted position of Dynastic MPs across four selected amendment to this legislation. For instance, the first row displays information on a bill that had the goal of reducing the barriers a candidate faced when deciding to run in a given race. In particular, the amendment sought to transfer the payment of a returning officer's expenses (defrayed by candidates under the status quo) to the public purse. Given the advantage in resources that dynastic politicians enjoy, the prediction is that they should be more likely to oppose including the clause in the act.

portation of voters to the polls). This practice was considered a source of corruption, but several members of parliament considered that restricting this practice would also disenfranchise many voters (Rix, 2008, p. 74). In particular, observers at the time considered that Conservative candidates had an advantage along this dimension, but banning the practices of conveyances would also affect the turnout of individuals belonging to the working class and out-voters (ibid., p. 72-74). Thus, if dynastic politicians had an advantage in personal resources that could be used to transport voters to the polls, they should have been more likely to oppose the amendment banning this practice.

The third provision discussed in the process leading to the approval of this reform was that of prohibiting the use of public houses to carry out business related to elections. According to Sir Henry James, the attorney general at the time, the rationale for introducing this clause to the bill was to prevent treating (i.e., offering food or drink in order to influence an individual's vote), as in past election petitions this practice had been identified taking place in public houses and hotels (Hans vol. 269, 03 July 1883, 196). Therefore, if dynastic politicians relied on patronage to win elections, and one of the ways of doing so was purchasing votes in public houses, they should be more likely to oppose the proposed clause.

Finally, the fourth amendment analyzed in this section deals with the entertainment of

constituents and potential supporters. As it has been noted, one of the main goals of the legislation was to define illegal and corrupt practices in elections. The entertainment of voters was one the practices discussed when debating the legislation. One proposal aimed at limiting the restrictions on existing practices. In particular, the amendment analyzed in this section had the purpose of protecting the entertainment of constituents. The amendment specifically sought to protect any entertainment that was "consistent with a person mode of living". As such, the proposed clause would permit wealthy patrons entertain potential supporters without fear of being penalized. And again, dynasts, owing to their resources have an advantage along this dimension and the way they maintained support among the electorate, should be more likely to support the inclusion of the proposed clause.

To test these predictions, I fit a linear probability model, where the outcome of interest is a binary indicator for whether a given MP is in favor of a specific amendement and zero otherwise. As predictors, I include binary indicators for the dynastic background of MPs and the party they represent in parliament (Conservative, Liberal, Liberal/Labour, Home Rule, and Home Rule Parnellites). Table 10 reports the estimates from fitting this model. The results show a clear partisan divide in the vote for each of the amendments. For instance, relative to Conservative MPs, Liberals were more likely to support reducing barriers to entry in electoral races, restricting the practice of conveyances, forbidding the use of public houses to carry out electoral business, and less willing to make legal the entertainment of electors.

However, consistent with the predictions laid out in Table 9, the results show that independent of partisan affiliation, dynastic MPs were less likely to support reducing barriers to entry for candidates running for office (Column 1), restricting the practice of conveyances (Column 2), prohibiting the use of public houses to carry out business related to election (Column 3), and more likely to vote in favor of protecting the practice of entertaining constituents. Further, with the exception of the result for the amendment aimed a restricting conveyances, all point estimates are statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a picture where dynastic politicians vote against rules that would erode their personal advantage.

I also examine whether dynastic politicians were more likely to vote against their party across each of these four key amendments. To do so, I restrict the sample to members of parliament affiliated with either of the two main parties (Conservatives and Liberals). Based on this sample, I fit a linear probability model where the outcome of interest is again MP support for each of the selected amendments. The predictors now include a dummy for whether an individual is a member of the liberal party, whether he is a dynastic politician, and the interaction between the two. The main parameters of interest are the coefficient on the dummy indicating whether an MP is a dynastic politician, and the coefficient of the interaction between the liberal and dynastic status of legislators. The first captures the propensity of Conservative dynastic MPs to vote along party lines; the sum of this parameter along with the one for the interaction report the same quantity of interest for Liberal dynastic MPs.

Table 11 reports the results from fitting this model. Columns (1)-(4) show that there are clear differences only in the proposed amendment to reduce barriers to entry in electoral races and the amendment aimed at protecting the practice of entertainment. In the first case, Liberal dynastic MP were about 16 percentage points less likely to vote for the measure aimed

	Pr(Aye)			
	Reduce Barriers	Restrict Conveyances	Forbid Public Houses	Allow Entertainment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dynastic	-0.084^{**}	-0.032	-0.093^{**}	0.072^{*}
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Home Rule	0.711^{***}	0.095	0.426^{***}	-0.518^{***}
	(0.085)	(0.120)	(0.126)	(0.129)
Home Rule (P)	0.887^{***}	0.493^{***}	-0.127	0.054
	(0.099)	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.083)
Liberal	0.311^{***}	0.282^{***}	0.701^{***}	-0.848^{***}
	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Liberal/Lab.	0.952^{***}	0.985^{***}	0.850^{***}	-0.827^{***}
	(0.247)	(0.258)	(0.258)	(0.217)
Intercept	0.048	0.015	0.150^{***}	0.827^{***}
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Observations	313	278	295	114
R^2	0.367	0.163	0.487	0.795

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 10: **Dynastic MP support for selected amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.** The table reports the point estimates for the difference in support among Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs (under a linear probability) across four selected amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883. The results shows that independent of partisan affiliations, dynastic MPs were less likely to support measures that curbed patronage and corruption (reducing barriers to entry, restricting conveyances, and banning the use of public houses to carry out business) but more likely to support the one that protected such practices (i.e., allowing for the entertainment of constituents). With the exception of the conveyances amendment, the difference in support/rejection between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs across the selected amendments is statistically significant.

at charging a returning officer's expenses to the public coffers. In the second case we instead find that conservative dynastic MPs were about 12 percentage points more likely to vote for a measure protecting the practice of entertainment relative to their non-dynastic colleagues.

Together, the evidence in this section suggests that dynastic politicians had an advantage in personal resources, and that this advantage manifested itself in the form of patronage towards electors and officials (paying expenses of returning officers, conveying electors to the polls, treating them in public houses, and entertaining them). As a result, when the momentous Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 was discussed, they supported any measure that could protect their electoral advantage.

Further, the evidence suggests that dynastic politicians were a vestige of the past and

	Pr(Aye)			
	Reduce Barriers	Restrict Conveyances	Forbid Public Houses	Allow Entertainment
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dynastic	−0.014	0.000	−0.057	0.129*
	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Liberal	0.379***	0.306***	0.720***	−0.800***
	(0.054)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.054)
Liberal * Dynastic	−0.161*	−0.061	−0.038	−0.129
	(0.083)	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.084)
Intercept	0.014	−0.000	0.132***	0.800***
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Observations	278	262	280	101
R^2	0.204	0.134	0.488	0.823

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 11: **Difference in support rates between Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs conditional on party affiliation (Conservative or Liberal) for selected amendments to the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883.** The table reports the estimates for the difference in support rates between Conservative Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs and Liberal Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs for each of four selected amendments under a linear probability model. The main quantities of interest are the estimate for the coefficient of the Dynastic variable and the sum of this coefficient and the sum of the one for the interaction between the Liberal and Dynastic variables. The first quantity represents how likely were dynastic Conservative MPs to support an amendment in relation to their Conservative non-dynastic peers. The second quantity reports the same measure for Liberal MPs. The table shows that there are only significant differences in the reduction in barriers to entry and the allowing entertainment amendments. In the first case, dynastic Liberal MPs were less likely to vote for the amendment relative to their non-dynastic colleagues. In the second case, Conservative dynastic MPs were more likely to vote for the amendment in relation to their Conservative non-dynastic peers.

antithetical to the development of the British party system. One of the key insights in Cox (1987) is that in the context of larger franchises resulting from different reforms, representatives could no longer rely on influence in order to win elections. Instead, politicians turned to voting with their party in order to signal policy positions and thereby win the support of voters. But the evidence offered in this section suggests that dynastic politicians remained attached to patronage.

F Who Controlled the Party Agenda?

In addition to differences in effectiveness of local party associations, Liberals and Conservatives had a different experience in terms of party leadership and party organizational development. As discussed in Section 3 of the paper, the year 1867 marked a the ascendance of the Radical wing to the leadership of the Liberal party and the development of party organizations. During the same period the Conservative party remained attached to its traditional basis of authority, and while the party undertook several organizational innovations, local party organizations remained ineffectual (Ziblatt, 2017).

These factors have implications for the legislative behavior dynastic and non-dynastic MPs across parties. In particular, the trade-off between relying on dynasts to secure an electoral victory at the expense of party discipline must have been particularly stark for the Liberal party. The party needed needed to cater to the newly enfranchised voters, but doing so threatened the interests of politicians belonging to old aristocratic families elected in constituencies where the party did not have a strong organization. As a result, and given the timing of the change in party leadership, we should see that the difference in dissent rates between dynastic and non-dynastic parties in the Liberal party to become positive and significant only after 1867. In contrast, we should not observed any significant difference in the of Conservative dynastic and non-dynastic legislators. Both their leadership remained elitist and its organizations were ineffective.

To test this claim, I examine differences in dissent rates between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs across the five parliaments elected in the years 1859-1880. Figure 11 plots differences in the probability of dissent (and 95 percent confidence intervals) between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs by political party across time. The patterns displayed in the figure are consistent with the logic outlined in the previous paragraph. After the Second Reform Act of 1867 we observe that the difference in probability of dissent became positive for Liberals. In contrast, we observe that in the five parliaments in the period spanning the years 1859-1880 there were no significant differences in the dissent rates between dynasts and non-dynasts in the Conservative party.[4]

[4]As further evidence of the decline of the power of dynasts within the Liberal party, Figure 6 in Appendix D shows that, relative to the Conservative party, Liberals experienced a significant decline in the proportion of dynastic MPs in the post-1867 period.



Figure 11: **Dissent Probability of Dynastic versus Non-Dynastic MPs by Party Affiliation and Parliamentary Session.** The figure plots difference in predicted probabilities of dissent (and 95 percent confidence intervals) between dynastic and non-dynastic MPs in the years 1859-1885 for the two major parties in Victorian Britain.

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